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Governing the banking system: an assessment of resilience based on Elinor Ostrom's design principles

机译：管理银行系统：基于Elinor Ostrom设计原则的恢复力评估

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摘要

The problem of financial stability is political and institutional, rather than narrowly economic. To achieve a more resilient financial system, we need to pay attention to the incentives of actors who have the power to act discretionarily, and to the knowledge limitations of such actors in the face of substantial complexity and uncertainty. The literature on polycentric governance and institutional resilience provides key insights that the literature on financial stability has thus far neglected. We offer an analysis based on the "design principles" for robust governance institutions proposed by Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom. We apply these principles to banking systems and explore under what conditions a banking system can be expected to discover rules that align private incentives with broader financial stability, and generate the necessary knowledge to govern such a complex system. This perspective challenges both "microprudential" and "macroprudential" approaches, which assume a monocentric financial and banking regulator.
机译：金融稳定的问题是政治和机构，而不是狭隘的经济。为实现更具弹性的金融体系，我们需要注意具有行动权正常行动的行动者的激励，以及面对大量复杂性和不确定性的行为者的知识限制。关于多中心治理和制度恢复力的文献提供了关键的见解，即财务稳定的文献迄今为止忽视了。我们根据诺贝尔劳特埃·埃林·鸵鸟提出的强大治理机构的“设计原则”提供分析。我们将这些原则应用于银行系统，并在银行系统可以预期的条件下探索，以发现与更广泛的金融稳定性对齐私人激励的规则，并产生必要的知识来管理这种复杂的系统。这种透视挑战“微促进”和“宏观普制”方法，这假设单眼财务和银行监管机构。

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