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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of International Economics >Trade skirmishes safeguards: A theory of the WTO dispute settlement process
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Trade skirmishes safeguards: A theory of the WTO dispute settlement process

机译：贸易冲突保障措施：WTO争端解决程序理论

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摘要

I propose a framework within which to interpret and evaluate the major reforms introduced to the GATT system in its transition to the WTO. In particular, I examine the WTO Agreement on Safeguards that has amended the GATT escape clause (Article XIX), and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) that resembles a court of law under the WTO. Using this framework, I interpret the weakening of the reciprocity principle under the Agreement on Safeguards as an attempt to reduce efficiency-reducing trade skirmishes. The DSB is interpreted as an impartial arbitrator that announces its opinion about the state of the world when a dispute arises among member countries. I demonstrate that the reforms in the GATT escape clause should be bundled with the introduction of the DSB, in order to maintain the incentive compatibility of trade agreements. The model implies that trade agreements under the WTO lead to fewer trade skirmishes but this effect does not necessarily result in higher payoffs to the governments. The model also implies that the introduction of the WTO court, which has no enforcement power, can improve the self-enforceability of trade agreements.
机译：我提出了一个框架，在该框架内解释和评估关贸总协定体系向世贸组织过渡时所进行的重大改革。特别是，我研究了修正了关贸总协定逃避条款（第XIX条）的世贸组织保障措施协定，以及类似于世贸组织下的法院的争端解决机构（DSB）。我使用这个框架，将《保障措施协定》中互惠原则的弱化解释为试图减少降低效率的贸易小规模冲突。 DSB被解释为公正的仲裁员，当成员国之间发生争端时，它将宣布其对世界状况的看法。我表明，关贸总协定逃避条款的改革应与DSB的引入捆绑在一起，以保持贸易协定的激励相容性。该模型暗示，世贸组织下的贸易协定导致较少的贸易小规模冲突，但这种影响并不一定会导致向政府带来更高的收益。该模型还暗示，引入没有执行权的WTO法院可以提高贸易协定的自我执行能力。

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