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The Limits of Judicial Control and the Nondelegation Doctrine

机译:司法控制的局限性与不授权原则

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The nondelegation doctrine has been fought over for decades, yet scholars have not examined a foundational question: can judicial doctrine materially shape legislative drafting practices? Even if a strong nondelegation doctrine provides legislators an incentive to draft narrow statutes, they would have many reasons to persist in broad delegations, and it is not clear whether the doctrinal incentives predominate. Here, I examine the relationship between the nondelegation doctrine and lawmaking behavior at the state level using several novel datasets, including a collection of state session laws between 1990 and 2010, and a comprehensive survey of state nondelegation judicial decisions over the last 20 years. Contrary to the common assumption, I find that the robustness of the nondelegation doctrine appears essentially unrelated to legislative drafting practices. This pattern suggests the limited extent to which judicial doctrine can control legislative practices; it also suggests a revived nondelegation doctrine at the federal level is unlikely to effectuate the hopes of proponents or the fears of opponents.
机译:非授权理论已经斗争了数十年,但是学者们没有研究一个基本的问题:司法理论可以实质性地影响立法的起草实践吗?即使强有力的不授权原则为立法者提供了起草狭窄法规的动力,他们仍然有许多理由可以坚持广泛的授权,而且尚不清楚教义性激励是否占主导地位。在这里,我使用几个新颖的数据集研究了州一级的非授权理论与立法行为之间的关系,其中包括1990年至2010年的州会议法律的集合,以及对过去20年中州非授权司法判决的全面调查。与通常的假设相反,我发现不授权原则的健全性似乎与立法起草做法无关。这种模式表明司法理论可以控制立法实践的程度有限;这也表明,在联邦一级重新实行的非授权理论不太可能实现支持者的希望或反对者的恐惧。

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