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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of law, economics, & organization >Campaign Contributions from Corporate Executives in Lieu of Political Action Committees
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Campaign Contributions from Corporate Executives in Lieu of Political Action Committees

机译：公司高管代替政治行动委员会的竞选捐款

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摘要

Limiting corporate participation in electoral politics is a central focus of campaign finance reform. In this spirit, individual candidates for office have prohibited corporate-linked political action committees (PACs) from contributing to their campaigns. On the surface, such no-PAC policies might seem like an effective way to keep corporate-linked monies out of electoral politics; however, they ignore the reality that corporate monies have a variety of ways to find their way into candidates' campaign accounts. We leverage these candidate-specific refusals to accept PAC monies to uncover concomitant spikes in the pattern of corporate executives' personal campaign contributions that are most pronounced for executives at firms with active PACs which contributed to the candidates in question. These results come from a newly constructed dataset that includes all CEO-firm-candidate contribution pairs for active S&P500 firms over an 18-year period and suggests that CEOs strategically act in lieu of their firms' linked PACs. (JEL D72, L51)
机译：限制公司参与选举政治是竞选财务改革的中心重点。本着这种精神，上任的个人候选人禁止与公司有联系的政治行动委员会（PACs）为竞选活动做出贡献。从表面上看，这种无PAC政策似乎是一种将与公司挂钩的资金排除在选举政治之外的有效方法。但是，他们忽略了现实，即公司资金可以通过多种方式进入候选人的竞选帐户。我们利用这些针对候选人的拒绝来接受PAC款项，以发现公司高管个人竞选活动模式的伴随尖峰，这对于拥有活跃PAC的公司的高管为候选人提供了最明显的表现。这些结果来自一个新构建的数据集，该数据集包含18年内活跃的S＆P500公司的所有CEO-候选人-候选人贡献对，并表明CEO采取战略行动来代替公司的关联PAC。 （JEL D72，L51）

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