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An Exploration of the Promotion Signaling Distortion

机译：促进信号失真的探讨

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Beginning with Waldman, Michael. 1984a. "Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency," 15 Rand Journal of Economics 255-67, it is well understood that in a world characterized by asymmetric learning promotions can serve as a signal of worker ability which can, in turn, lead to an inefficiently small number of promotions. In this article, we explore two related issues. First, how robust is the finding of a promotion signaling distortion to different ways of modeling the promotion process? Second, what are the various forms that the promotion signaling distortion can take? Our first conclusion is that a promotion signaling distortion exists across a wide range of settings, including some for which earlier work suggests no distortion. Our second conclusion is that, even if there is no inefficiency concerning the number of promotions, there can still be a promotion distortion that takes the form of inefficiencies concerning who is promoted.
机译：从迈克尔·沃尔德曼开始。 1984a。 15 Rand Journal of Economics 255-67：“工作分配，信号和效率”，众所周知，在一个以学习不对称为特征的世界中，升职可以作为工人能力的信号，反过来又会导致效率低下。少量促销。在本文中，我们探讨了两个相关的问题。首先，发现促销信号失真对促销过程建模的不同方式有多稳健？其次，促销信令失真可以采取多种形式？我们的第一个结论是，促销信号在多种设置中都存在失真，包括一些早期工作表明没有失真的信号。我们的第二个结论是，即使促销数量没有效率低下，促销失真仍然会以低效率的形式出现在促销对象身上。

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