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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of law, economics, & organization >Contracting Externalities and Mandatory Menus in the US Corporate Bankruptcy Code
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Contracting Externalities and Mandatory Menus in the US Corporate Bankruptcy Code

机译：美国公司破产法中的合同外部性和强制性菜单

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Our article offers the first justification for the US bankruptcy code, in which firms are not allowed to commit themselves ex ante in their lending agreements either to (Chapter 7) liquidation or to (Chapter 11) reorganization in case of distress ex post. If fire-sale liquidation imposes negative externalities on their peers, then firms can be collectively better off if they are all forced into a no-opt-out choice (a mandatory "menu"). This is the case even though they would individually want to commit themselves to liquidation, and it is collectively better for them than voluntary contract choice or mandatory liquidation. Our article's innovation is thus to show not when a later choice should be prohibited, but when a later choice should be mandatory. Equivalent analyses could justify when other ex post choices should remain inalienable (not contractible). (JEL G33, D62, K12).
机译：我们的文章为美国破产法提供了第一个理由，在该法中，不允许公司在其贷款协议中事先承诺（第7章）清算或发生事后困境时进行（第11章）重组。如果抛售清算对同行施加了负面的外部性，那么如果所有公司都被迫采取无退出选择（强制性“菜单”），则它们可以集体受益。即使他们愿意单独进行清算，情况也是这样，对他们而言，集体选择要比自愿选择合同或强制清算更好。因此，本文的创新之处在于，它不显示何时应禁止以后选择，而应表明何时应强制以后选择。等效分析可以证明其他事后选择应保持不可分割性（不可收缩）的合理性。 （JEL G33，D62，K12）。

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