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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of law, economics, & organization >Congressional Assertions of the Spending Power: Institutional Conflict and Regulatory Authority
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Congressional Assertions of the Spending Power: Institutional Conflict and Regulatory Authority

机译：国会关于支出权力的断言：机构冲突与监管权

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This study seeks to answer a crucial and unexplored question about American regulatory law and policy: How do majority coalitions in Congress use the spending power to circumvent intra-branch conflict and judicial constraints against regulating by finding alternate avenues to regulate states and private actors? This study provides the first large-scale empirical evidence of congressional use of the spending power to assert implementation authority in the face of constraints against more direct legislating. It is through this process of conditioning funds upon regulatory compliance that Congress works toward ideal policy outcomes without inciting institutional conflict with the other branches or from the opposing party. I base my conditional spending analysis on data on statutory specificity and congressional delegation from the 80th to the 110th Congresses provided by Farhang, and include additional measures of institutional conflict. The above argument is supported by the empirical analysis. (JEL K20, K23).
机译：这项研究旨在回答有关美国监管法律和政策的一个关键且尚未探索的问题：国会中的多数联盟如何通过寻找替代方法来规制州和私人行为者，如何利用消费能力来规避分支机构内部的冲突和司法约束以防止规制？这项研究提供了第一个大规模的经验证据，表明国会在面对更直接立法的制约时，会利用支出能力来主张执行权。国会正是通过这种以法规遵从为条件调节资金的过程，努力实现理想的政策成果，而又不会煽动与其他分支机构或反对党的体制冲突。我的条件性支出分析基于法航（Farhang）提供的第80届至第110届国会代表的法定特殊性和国会授权的数据，并包括其他有关制度冲突的措施。以上观点得到了经验分析的支持。 （JEL K20，K23）。

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