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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of law, economics, & organization >Sinking Costs to Force or Deter Settlement
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Sinking Costs to Force or Deter Settlement

机译：下沉成本以强迫或阻止解决

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This article develops a simple but general model of suit and settlement given symmetric information. Plaintiffs and defendants can choose when and to what extent they sink litigation costs through the use of retainers and detailed pleading. I demonstrate sharp asymmetries in the ability of plaintiffs and defendants to use sunk costs strategically to obtain or deter nuisance-value settlements. The model accounts for the roles of the merits, litigation costs, and bargaining power; incorporates complaints and answers for which parties' investments in pleading detail are endogenously determined; permits strategic default by the defendant; and nests several existing models of negative-expected-value litigation as special cases. It generates testable, counterintuitive, empirical predictions, and facilitates normative analysis. For example, the model predicts that plausibility pleading standards will have modest effects in deterring low-merit suits but may be harmful to plaintiffs and defendants settling stronger cases.
机译：本文针对给定对称信息，开发了一套简单但通用的诉讼和解决模型。原告和被告可以选择通过使用聘用人和详细的辩护来降低诉讼成本的时间和范围。我证明了原告和被告有战略性地使用沉没成本获得或阻止滋扰价值和解的能力方面的不对称现象。该模型说明了案情的作用，诉讼成本和议价能力；包含投诉和答案，有关投诉和答案的内在细节由当事方确定；允许被告进行战略性违约；并将几种现有的负期望值诉讼模型嵌套为特例。它生成可检验的，违反直觉的，经验性的预测，并促进规范性分析。例如，该模型预测，合理性恳求标准在阻止低价值诉讼中将具有适度的效果，但可能对原告和被告人和解较弱的案件有害。

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