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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of law, economics, & organization >Water Under the Bridge: Determinants of Franchise Renewal in Water Provision
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Water Under the Bridge: Determinants of Franchise Renewal in Water Provision

机译：桥下的水：供水中特许经营权更新的决定因素

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摘要

Williamson's 1976 study of natural-monopoly franchise bidding launched extensive debate concerning the degree to which transaction-cost problems afflict government franchising. We propose that municipalities vary in ability to discipline franchisees, and that this heterogeneous ability affects franchise renewal patterns and the quasi-rents that franchisees extract. We study provision of municipal water services in France, a setting characterized by both direct public provision and franchised private providers. We find that small municipalities pay a significant price premium for franchisee-provided water when compared with publicly provided water; in contrast, large municipalities do not pay a premium on average. Further, large municipalities are less likely to renew an incumbent franchisee that charges an "excessive" price, while small municipalities' renewal patterns are not influenced by franchisees' excessive pricing. We interpret the results as evidence that although large municipalities can discipline franchisees and thus prevent extraction of quasi-rents, small municipalities are less able to do so due to weaker outside options.
机译：威廉姆森（Williamson）在1976年对自然垄断特许经营权招标的研究引发了广泛的辩论，涉及交易成本问题对政府特许经营的影响程度。我们建议市政当局对特许经营者进行纪律的能力各不相同，并且这种异质性能力会影响特许经营权的更新模式和特许经营者提取的准租金。我们研究法国的市政供水服务的提供，这种环境既有直接的公共提供，也有专营的私人提供者。我们发现，与公共提供的水相比，小城市要为加盟商提供的水支付高额的价格；相比之下，大型城市平均不会支付溢价。此外，大型市政当局不太可能对收取“过高”价格的现有特许经营者进行续约，而小型市政当局的续约模式不受特许经营者过度定价的影响。我们将结果解释为证据，尽管大型市政当局可以对特许经营者进行纪律处分，从而阻止准租房的提取，但由于外部选择较弱，小型市政当局的能力却较弱。

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