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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of law, economics, & organization >Voting For The President: The Supreme Court During War
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Voting For The President: The Supreme Court During War

机译：投票总统：战争期间的最高法院

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An extraordinary body of scholarship suggests that wars, especially major wars, stimulate presidential power. And central to this argument is a conviction that judges predictably uphold elements of presidents' policy agendas in war that would not withstand judicial scrutiny in peace. Few scholars, however, have actually subjected this claim to quantitative investigation. This article does so. Examining the universe of Supreme Court cases to which the US Government, a cabinet member, or a president was a named party over a 75-year period, and estimating a series of fixed effects and matching models, we find that during war Justices were 15 percentage points more likely to side with the government on the statutory cases that most directly implicated the president. We also document sizable effects associated with both the transitions from peace to war and from war to peace. On constitutional cases, however, null effects are consistently observed. These various estimates are robust to a wide variety of model specifications and do not appear to derive from the deep selection biases that pervade empirical studies of the courts.
机译：非凡的学术研究表明，战争，特别是大战，会激发总统的权力。该论点的核心是信念，即法官在战争中可以预见地支持总统的政策议程中的某些内容，而这些内容将无法承受和平方面的司法审查。但是，很少有学者实际对此主张进行过定量研究。本文是这样做的。检查美国政府，内阁成员或总统在过去75年间担任最高法院提名的最高法院案件的范围，并估计一系列固定影响和匹配模型，我们发现在战争期间，法官有15位在与总统最直接牵连的法定案件中，政府更有可能支持一个百分点。我们还记录了与从和平到战争以及从战争到和平的过渡相关的巨大影响。但是，在宪法案件中，始终观察到无效影响。这些不同的估计值对各种模型规格均具有鲁棒性，并且似乎并非源于对法院进行实证研究的深层选择偏见。

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