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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of management & governance >Board compensation and ownership structure: empirical evidence for Italian listed companies
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Board compensation and ownership structure: empirical evidence for Italian listed companies

机译：董事会薪酬和所有权结构：意大利上市公司的经验证据

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This paper investigates the relationships among corporate ownership, the level of board compensation, and firms' future performance within Italian listed companies. Board compensation could be related to corporate ownership characteristics, like the type of controlling shareholder, ownership concentration, the separation between cash flow and voting rights, and the presence of shareholders' agreements. The evidence of high levels of board compensation associated with certain governance characteristics could signal, in a principal-agent framework, rent extraction by entrenched managers or by controlling shareholders versus minority shareholders; high board compensation, however, could be related to the need to hire directors with higher professional standing and also to the desire to create a network with other companies through the enlargement of the board, according to a social network view. In this paper we disentangle this issue showing the relationship between excess board compensation and future performance: examining firms listed on the Milan Stock Exchange over the period 1995-2002, we show that board compensation is linked to many governance characteristics, but excess compensation is never positively related to future performance. For founder family firms, in particular, high board compensation is associated with (a) smaller board size; (b) higher proportion of family members on the board; (c) lower future performance. The whole evidence therefore doesn't support the hypothesis suggested by the social network view, but is consistent with a rent extraction hypothesis. These results could add new empirical evidence to the recent debate on the need for global remuneration reform. According to our results, some control mechanism and an increase in transparency of executive compensation schemes could be appropriate.
机译：本文研究了意大利上市公司中公司所有权，董事会薪酬水平以及公司未来绩效之间的关系。董事会薪酬可能与公司所有权特征有关，例如控股股东的类型，所有权集中度，现金流量与投票权之间的分离以及股东协议的存在。在委托代理框架下，与某些治理特征相关的高额董事薪酬的信号可能表明，根深蒂固的管理人员或控股股东与少数股东之间的租金提取；然而，根据社交网络的观点，高昂的董事会薪酬可能与聘请具有更高专业地位的董事的需求有关，也与通过扩大董事会规模与其他公司建立网络的愿望有关。在本文中，我们解开了这个问题，显示了董事会超额报酬与未来绩效之间的关系：研究1995-2002年在米兰证券交易所上市的公司，我们发现董事会报酬与许多治理特征相关，但是超额报酬从来没有与未来的业绩成正比。特别是对于创始人家族企业而言，高的董事会薪酬与（a）较小的董事会规模有关； （b）董事会中家庭成员比例更高； （c）降低未来表现。因此，整个证据不支持社交网络观点提出的假设，但与租金提取假设一致。这些结果可能为最近关于全球薪酬改革必要性的辩论提供新的经验证据。根据我们的结果，某种控制机制和增加高管薪酬计划的透明度可能是适当的。

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