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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of management information systems >Intermediation in a Sharing Economy: Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Rent Extraction
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Intermediation in a Sharing Economy: Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Rent Extraction

机译：共享经济中的中介：保险，道德风险和租金提取

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摘要

A key impediment to sharing is a lender's concern about damage to a lent item due to unobservable actions by a renter, usually resulting in moral hazard. This paper shows how an intermediary can eliminate the moral hazard problem by providing optimal insurance to the lender and first-best incentives to the renter to exert care, as long as market participants are risk neutral. The solution is illustrated for the collaborative housing market but applies in principle to any sharing market with vertically differentiated goods. A population of renters, heterogeneous both in their preferences for housing quality and with respect to the amount of care they exert in a rental situation, face a choice between collaborative housing and staying at a local hotel. The private hosts choose their prices strategically, and the intermediary sets commission rates on both sides of the market as well as insurance terms for the rental agreement. The latter are set to eliminate moral hazard. The intermediary is able to extract the gains the hosts would earn if transacting directly. Finally, even if hotels set their prices at the outset so as to maximize collusive profits, collaborative housing persists at substantial market shares, regardless of the difference between the efficiencies of hosts and hotels to reduce renters' cost of effort. The aggregate of hosts, intermediary, and hotels benefits from (a variety in) these effort costs, which indicates that the intermediated sharing of goods is an economically viable, robust phenomenon.
机译：共享的主要障碍是，放贷者担心由于承租人无法观察到的行为而导致的对借出物品的损坏，通常会导致道德风险。本文展示了只要市场参与者对风险保持中立，中介人如何通过为贷方提供最佳保险以及为房客提供谨慎服务的最佳激励措施来消除道德风险问题。该解决方案针对协作住房市场进行了说明，但原则上适用于具有垂直差异商品的任何共享市场。在对住房质量的偏好以及对他们在租赁情况下所提供的护理数量的偏好各异的租户群体中，他们面临的选择是在合作住房还是在当地旅馆中住宿。私人房东从战略上选择价格，中介机构确定市场双方的佣金率以及租赁协议的保险条款。后者旨在消除道德风险。中间人能够提取主机直接进行交易时将获得的收益。最后，即使酒店从一开始就设定价格以最大程度地提高串通利润，但无论房东和酒店在降低租房者的工作成本效率上的差异如何，合作住房都将保持可观的市场份额。主持人，中介人和酒店的合计得益于这些工作成本（多种），这表明中间的商品共享是一种经济上可行的稳健现象。

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