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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of organizational behavior >An experimental study of the interaction effects of incentive compensation, career ambition, and task attention on Chinese managers' strategic risk behaviors
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An experimental study of the interaction effects of incentive compensation, career ambition, and task attention on Chinese managers' strategic risk behaviors

机译：激励薪酬，职业野心和任务注意力对中国管理者战略风险行为互动影响的实验研究

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Building on the person-pay interaction model, we developed and tested a model for the influence of managers' career ambition and task attention on their responses to incentive compensation under different conditions of firm performance. We argued that managers with greater career ambition and task attention will be more responsive to incentive compensation, thereby engaging in more strategic risk behaviors, such as strategic risk taking and strategic change. Results of our experiment using a managerial decision-making game with a sample of Chinese managers partially supported this contingency perspective. Under the condition of performance decline, managers' career ambition only accentuated the positive relationship between incentive compensation and strategic change. By contrast, task attention strengthened the positive relationships between incentive compensation and both strategic risk taking and strategic change. However, under the condition of performance growth, neither managers' career ambition nor their task attention influenced their responses to incentive compensation. We discuss the implications for how organizational leaders can use incentive compensation to influence the strategic risk behaviors of managers. Copyright (c) 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
机译：在人与薪互动模型的基础上，我们开发并测试了一个模型，该模型对经理的职业抱负和任务注意力对他们在不同公司绩效条件下对激励薪酬的响应的影响进行了测试。我们认为，具有更大的事业野心和任务专注度的管理人员将对激励性薪酬做出更快速的反应，从而参与更多的战略风险行为，例如战略风险承担和战略变革。我们使用管理决策游戏与中国管理人员样本进行的实验结果部分支持了这种偶然性观点。在绩效下降的情况下，管理者的职业野心只强调了激励性薪酬与战略变革之间的正向关系。相比之下，任务注意力加强了激励补偿与战略风险承担和战略变革之间的积极关系。但是，在绩效增长的条件下，管理者的职业野心和工作注意力都不会影响他们对激励性薪酬的反应。我们讨论了组织领导者如何使用激励性薪酬来影响经理的战略风险行为的含义。版权所有（c）2015 John Wiley＆Sons，Ltd.

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