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Compensating for unequal parental investments in schooling

机译:补偿父母在学校上的不平等投资

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摘要

This paper investigates how rural families in China use marital and post-marital transfers to compensate their sons for unequal schooling expenditures. Using a common behavioral framework, we derive two methods for estimating the relationship between parental transfers and schooling investments: the log-linear and multiplicative household fixed-effects regression models. Using data from a unique household-level survey, we strongly reject the log-linear specification. Results from the multiplicative model suggest that when a son receives 1 yuan less in schooling investment than his brother, he obtains 0.47 yuan more in transfers as partial compensation. Since our measure of transfers represents a substantial fraction of total parental transfers, sons with more schooling likely enjoy higher lifetime consumption. Redistribution within the household may be limited by either the parents' desire for consumption equality or bargaining constraints imposed by their children. Controlling for unobserved household heterogeneity and a fuller accounting of lifetime transfers are quantitatively important.
机译:本文研究了中国农村家庭如何通过婚姻和婚后转移支付儿子不平等的教育支出。使用一个共同的行为框架,我们推导出了两种估计父母转移支付和学校投资之间关系的方法:对数线性和乘性家庭固定效应回归模型。使用来自独特的家庭水平调查的数据,我们强烈反对对数线性规范。乘法模型的结果表明,当一个儿子的教育投资比他的兄弟少1元时,作为部分补偿,他可以获得多于0.47元的转移支付。由于我们的转移支付量占父母转移支付总额的很大一部分,因此受教育程度较高的儿子很可能会享受更高的终身消费。父母对消费平等的期望或子女施加的讨价还价限制可能会限制家庭内部的再分配。在数量上重要的是控制未观察到的家庭异质性和更完整地计算寿命转移。

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