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Public policy, dynamic status preferences, and wealth inequality

机译：公共政策，动态身份偏好和财富不平等

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This paper studies the effect of productive government spending (taxation) on aggregate savings behavior and its consequences for the dynamics of wealth inequality, taking into consideration key behavioral changes that occur during the process of economic development. Substantial empirical evidence suggests that during this process agents' preferences toward status (positional consumption) evolves according to the average wealth of the society. The sources of wealth include private capital and productive public capital, the latter financed by a distortionary income tax. This dynamic status effect impacts peoples' responses to tax policy in ways which contrast with those of the standard neoclassical model. Specifically, we find that in response to an increase in the income tax, in economies with a strong (weak) enough dynamic status effect, savings and inequality increase (decrease). Incorporating the behavioral changes to fiscal policy expands the set of mechanisms available to explain the observed variations of savings and wealth distribution dynamics that cannot be attributed to technological or other structural factors.
机译：本文研究了生产性政府支出（税收）对总储蓄行为的影响及其对财富不平等动态的影响，同时考虑了经济发展过程中发生的关键行为变化。大量的经验证据表明，在此过程中，代理人对地位（位置消费）的偏好根据社会的平均财富而发展。财富来源包括私人资本和生产性公共资本，后者由扭曲性所得税支付。这种动态身份效应以与新古典标准模型相反的方式影响人们对税收政策的反应。具体来说，我们发现，随着所得税税率的提高，在动态状态效应强（弱）的经济体中，储蓄和不平等现象增加（减少）。将行为变化纳入财政政策，扩大了可用于解释观察到的储蓄和财富分配动态变化的机制集，这些变化不能归因于技术或其他结构性因素。

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