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Participation, process and policy: the informational value of politicised judicial review

机译:参与,过程和政策:政治化司法审查的信息价值

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摘要

We develop a model of "notice and comment" rulemaking, focussing on strategic issues facing agencies and interest groups in light of judicial review in this process. Specifically, we analyse the incentives for agencies and groups to produce and reveal information during rulemaking. We show that judicial review can produce informed policymaking, but that participatory rulemaking can bias agency policymaking in favour of groups with access to the rule-making process. In addition, the model allows an analysis of doctrines of judicial review of agency policymaking. The model reveals that "politicised" judicial review can be beneficial because of its effects on agency incentives for information acquisition in policymaking. Accordingly, socially optimal judicial review may be "legally irrational" and, contrary to standard doctrines of judicial review in the United States, judicial deference to rules with thin records can be optimal.
机译:我们开发了一个“通知和评论”规则制定模型,重点是在此过程中根据司法审查针对代理机构和利益集团面临的战略问题。具体来说,我们分析了机构和团体在制定规则过程中产生和披露信息的动机。我们表明,司法审查可以产生明智的政策制定,但是参与性规则制定可以使代理机构的决策偏向于有利于可以进入规则制定程序的群体。此外,该模型还可以分析代理机构决策的司法审查理论。该模型表明,“政治化”司法审查可能会受益,因为它会影响代理机构在决策过程中获取信息的动机。因此,社会上最佳的司法审查可能是“法律上不合理的”,并且与美国的司法审查标准学说相反,司法遵守记录薄弱的规则可能是最佳的。

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