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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Public Policy >The electoral foundations to noncompliance: addressing the puzzle of unlawful state aid in the European Union
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The electoral foundations to noncompliance: addressing the puzzle of unlawful state aid in the European Union

机译：违规的选举基础：解决欧盟中非法国家援助的难题

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摘要

Electoral institutions shape the incentives of governments to rely on distributive measures and to comply with international obligations because of the misalignment they may engender between the collective objectives of a government party and the individual objectives of its members in the legislature. We use this argument to explain the puzzle of unlawful state aid measures in the European Union (EU). Existing theories of EU compliance and implementation offer no convincing explanation to their persistence and patterns. Using data from 2000 to 2012, we find that an increase of district magnitude improves compliance. However, compliance decreases with higher magnitude where either party leaders have no control over the ballot rank or other electoral rules strengthen the incentives to search for a personal vote. We also provide evidence for the effects of electoral reforms on compliance. These results have implications for the broader literature on compliance with international regimes.
机译：选举机构塑造了政府依赖分配措施和遵守国际义务的动机，因为它们可能导致政府党的集体目标与其立法机关成员的个人目标之间的不一致。我们用这个论点来解释欧盟（EU）中非法国家援助措施的困惑。欧盟合规与实施的现有理论没有令人信服的解释其持久性和模式。使用2000年至2012年的数据，我们发现地区数量级的增加可以提高合规性。但是，当政党领导人无法控制投票等级或其他选举规则加强了寻求个人投票的动机时，遵纪守法的程度就会大大提高。我们还提供了选举改革对合规性影响的证据。这些结果对有关遵守国际制度的更广泛的文献有启示。

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