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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Public Policy >The Lamfalussy Reform in the EU Securities Markets: Fiduciary Relationships, Policy Effectiveness and Balance of Power
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The Lamfalussy Reform in the EU Securities Markets: Fiduciary Relationships, Policy Effectiveness and Balance of Power

机译：欧盟证券市场的拉姆法西式改革：信托关系，政策有效性和均势

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In 2000 a Committee of Wise Men chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy, former president of the European Monetary Institute was appointed by the Economics and Finance Ministers Council to make recommendations on the regulation of the European securities markets. It proposed a four-level system to improve the legislative process while ensuring what it called a democratic and institutional balance. Our paper questions to what extent the concepts of two basic modes of delegation - agency and trust relationships — are appropriate tools to interpret the new structure set up by the Committee. It formulates hypotheses about its policy effectiveness and the balance of power between Community institutions. Evidence supports the agency hypothesis: the Lamfalussy process has reduced the average time taken to negotiate and adopt the first framework directives at level i and it has facilitated the removal of bottlenecks in the process through parallel working at levels i and 2. In this sense, delegation has enhanced policy effectiveness in the securities sector. But it is much more difficult to assess the trustee hypothesis: that is, whether the Commission and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) in fact act as trustees of the member states for the benefit of market actors. For the time being, whether CESR might evolve into a European securities regulator remains an open question.
机译：2000年，经济及财政部长理事会任命了一个由智贤委员会组成的智者委员会，该委员会由欧洲货币学院前主席亚历山大·兰法洛西（Alexandre Lamfalussy）任命，以就欧洲证券市场的监管提出建议。它提出了一个四级制度，以改善立法程序，同时确保所谓的民主和体制平衡。我们的论文质疑两种基本授权模式的概念（代理和信任关系）在多大程度上是解释委员会建立的新结构的适当工具。它提出了有关其政策有效性和共同体机构之间权力平衡的假设。证据支持代理机构的假设：Lamfalussy流程减少了在i层协商和采用第一个框架指令所需的平均时间，并且通过在i层和2层进行并行工作，简化了该过程中的瓶颈。代表团提高了证券部门的政策效力。但是要评估受托人的假设要困难得多：也就是说，委员会和欧洲证券监管机构委员会（CESR）是否实际上是为了市场行为者的利益而成为成员国的受托人。目前，CESR是否可能发展成为欧洲证券监管机构仍是一个悬而未决的问题。

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