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The geographic distribution of environmental inspections

机译：环境检查的地理分布

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摘要

Models of the enforcement of environmental regulations regarding point source pollution suppose that the probability of inspection or audit is independent across facilities. However, there are a number of reasons why regulators may choose to inspect many sites in a particular geographic area at one time. If the probability a site is inspected also depends on its compliance behavior, the expected payoff from choosing to violate will depend upon the compliance decisions of neighboring sites, creating a game of strategic interdependence between firms. In this paper, we use a dataset of inspections at petroleum storage sites in Manitoba between 1981 and 1998 to consider to what extent inspections are spatially correlated and whether inspection probabilities are a function of the inspection and violation history of the site and its neighbors. Further, we examine to what extent firms take into account whether their neighbors have been previously found in violation in determining compliance.
机译：有关点源污染的环境法规实施模型假设，检查或审核的可能性在各个设施之间是独立的。但是，出于多种原因，监管机构可能会选择一次检查特定地理区域中的许多站点。如果检查站点的可能性还取决于其合规行为，则从选择违规获得的预期收益将取决于相邻站点的合规决策，从而在企业之间形成了战略上相互依赖的博弈。在本文中，我们使用1981年至1998年间马尼托巴省石油存储站点的检查数据集来考虑检查在空间上的相关程度以及检查概率是否是该站点及其邻国的检查和违规历史的函数。此外，在确定合规性时，我们检查了企业在多大程度上考虑了先前是否发现邻居违反了企业的情况。

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