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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of regulatory economics >Toward a combined merchant-regulatory mechanism for electricity transmission expansion
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Toward a combined merchant-regulatory mechanism for electricity transmission expansion

机译：寻求扩大电力传输的商户监管机制

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摘要

Electricity transmission pricing and transmission grid expansion have received increasing attention in recent years. There are two disparate approaches to transmission investment: one employs the theory based on long-run financial rights (LTFTR) to transmission (merchant approach), while the other is based on the incentive-regulation hypothesis (regulatory approach). In this paper we consider the elements that could combine the merchant and regulatory approaches in a setting with price-taking electricity generators and loads. The monopoly transmission firm (Tran-sco) is regulated through benchmark or price regulation to provide long-term investment incentives. The two-part tariff approach used can be analyzed analytically only for well-behaved cost and demand functions. We explore a series of simplified transmission grids to argue that in a variety of circumstances those functions could have reasonable economic properties. The results suggest directions for further research to explore the properties of the cost functions and implications for design of practical incentive mechanisms and the integration with merchant investment in organized markets with LTFTRs.
机译：近年来，输电价格和输电电网的扩展受到越来越多的关注。转移投资有两种不同的方法：一种采用基于长期金融权利（LTFTR）进行转移的理论（商人方法），而另一种则基于激励-监管假设（监管方法）。在本文中，我们考虑了可以结合使用商户和监管方法的环境中具有价格承受力的发电机和负载的要素。垄断传输公司（Tran-sco）通过基准或价格法规进行监管，以提供长期投资激励。只能对行为良好的成本和需求函数进行分析性地使用所采用的两部分式关税方法。我们探索了一系列简化的输电网格，以为在各种情况下这些功能都可以具有合理的经济属性。结果为进一步研究成本功能的性质以及对实际激励机制的设计以及与LTFTRs在有组织的市场中与商人投资的整合提供了指导。

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