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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of regulatory economics >Incentive regulation, service quality, and standards in U.S. electricity distribution
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Incentive regulation, service quality, and standards in U.S. electricity distribution

机译：美国配电中的激励性法规，服务质量和标准

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摘要

The widespread use of incentive regulation in telecom, electricity, and other industries in the U.S. and elsewhere has raised questions about its possible adverse effect on the quality of service. This paper examines U.S. electricity distribution utilities in the years 1993-1999, several of which were subject to incentive regulation. Controlling for other possible influences, including possible endogeneity of the regulatory regime, the data and model indicate that incentive regulation is indeed associated with significantly longer duration of service outages, although not necessarily more frequent outages. Importantly, this quality reduction is offset in cases where regulation incorporates service quality standards. We also examine the causal chain connecting incentive regulation, cost expenditures, and service quality. We conclude that careful design of quality standards can allow incentive regulation to achieve cost savings without quality degradation.
机译：奖励法规在美国和其他地区的电信，电力和其他行业中的广泛使用，引发了对其可能对服务质量产生不利影响的疑问。本文研究了1993-1999年间的美国配电公司，其中有几家受到激励性法规的约束。在控制其他可能的影响（包括监管制度的内生性）后，数据和模型表明，激励监管确实与服务中断的持续时间显着相关，尽管不一定会导致更频繁的中断。重要的是，在法规纳入服务质量标准的情况下，这种质量下降被抵消了。我们还研究了激励机制，成本支出和服务质量之间的因果链。我们得出的结论是，精心设计质量标准可以使激励性监管实现成本节约而又不降低质量。

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