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Moral Hazard, Risk Sharing, and the Optimal Pool Size

机译:道德危害,风险分享和最佳池大小

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摘要

We examine the optimal size of risk pools with moral hazard. In risk pools, the effective share of the own loss borne is the sum of the direct share (the retention rate) and the indirect share borne as residual claimant. In a model with identical individuals with mixed risk-averse utility functions, we show that the effective share required to implement a specific effort increases in the pool size. This is a downside of larger pools as it, ceteris paribus, reduces risk sharing. However, we find that the benefit from diversifying the risk in larger pools always outweighs the downside of a higher effective share. We conclude that, absent transaction costs, the optimal pool size converges to infinity. In our basic model, we restrict attention to binary effort levels, but we show that our results extend to a model with continuous effort choice.
机译:我们检查具有道德风险的风险池的最佳大小。在风险池中,自身损失的有效份额是直接份额(保留率)的总和,间接股为剩余索赔人。在具有混合风险厌恶实用功能的相同个体的模型中,我们表明实施特定努力所需的有效份额增加了池大小。这是较大的游泳池的缺点,因为它是Ceteris Paribus,降低了风险分享。然而,我们发现,从更大游泳池的风险多样化的福利总是超过了更高的有效份额的缺点。我们得出结论,不存在的交易成本,最佳池大小会聚到无穷大。在我们的基本模式中,我们限制了对二元努力级别的关注,但我们表明我们的结果延伸到具有持续努力选择的模型。

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  • 来源
    《The journal of risk and insurance》 |2019年第2期|297-313|共17页
  • 作者单位

    Univ Bern IOP Engehaldenstr 4 CH-3012 Bern Switzerland;

    Frankfurt Sch Finance & Management Sonnemannstr 9-11 D-60314 Frankfurt Germany;

    Univ Complutense Madrid Fac Matemat Dept Algebra Plaza Ciencias 3 E-28040 Madrid Spain;

    Frankfurt Sch Finance & Management Sonnemannstr 9-11 D-60314 Frankfurt Germany;

    Univ Hohenheim Chair Insurance & Social Syst Fruwirthstr 48 D-70593 Stuttgart Germany;

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  • 正文语种 eng
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