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首页> 外文期刊>The journal of risk and insurance >ORGANIZATIONAL FORM, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, AND CEO TURNOVER: EVIDENCE FROM THE PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE INDUSTRY
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ORGANIZATIONAL FORM, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, AND CEO TURNOVER: EVIDENCE FROM THE PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE INDUSTRY

机译：组织形式，所有权结构和首席执行官离职：来自财产-财产保险业的证据

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摘要

We investigate the role of organizational form and ownership structure in corporate governance by examining CEO turnover for U.S. property-casualty insurers. Our article extends the prior literature by decomposing stock insurers into publicly traded and nonpublicly traded (closely held) entities and breaking down both types of stocks into family-owned and nonfamily-owned categories. We further subdivide family firms into those with family-member CEOs and those with nonfamily CEOs. We find that the probability of nonroutine turnover has a significant negative relationship with firm performance. Turnover probabilities vary significantly by organizational form and ownership structure. Family firms with family-member CEOs have the lowest turnover rate of any ownership type. The probability of nonroutine CEO turnover is lower for mutuals than for publicly traded nonfamily stock firms and also for all other types of stocks except closely held family stock firms and publicly traded family stocks with family-member CEOs. The results provide further evidence that organizational form matters in terms of controlling agency costs in financial services firms.
机译：我们通过检查美国财产保险公司的CEO营业额来调查组织形式和所有权结构在公司治理中的作用。本文通过将股票保险公司分解为公开交易和非公开交易（紧密控股）实体，并将两种类型的股票分为家族拥有和非家族拥有的类别来扩展现有文献。我们进一步将家族企业细分为具有家族成员CEO的家族企业和具有家族成员CEO的家族企业。我们发现，非常规营业额的可能性与公司绩效有着显着的负相关关系。离职概率因组织形式和所有权结构而有很大差异。拥有家族成员CEO的家族企业的所有人员流动率最低。共同体非常规CEO换手的可能性要比公开交易的非家族股票公司和所有其他类型的股票要低，除了紧密控股的家族股票公司和带有家族成员CEO的公开交易的家族股票。结果进一步证明了组织形式对控制金融服务公司的代理成本至关重要。

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  • 来源
    《The journal of risk and insurance》 |2017年第1期|95-126|共32页
  • 作者

    Cheng Jiang; Cummins J. David; Lin Tzuting;

  • 作者单位

    Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Shanghai, Peoples R China|Natl Chengchi Univ, Coll Commerce, Risk & Insurance Res Ctr, Taipei, Taiwan;

    Temple Univ, Risk Management & Insurance, Philadelphia, PA 19122 USA|Natl Chengchi Univ, Coll Commerce, Risk & Insurance Res Ctr, Taipei, Taiwan;

    Natl Taiwan Univ, Taipei, Taiwan|Natl Chengchi Univ, Coll Commerce, Risk & Insurance Res Ctr, Taipei, Taiwan;

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