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Patent Litigation Insurance

机译：专利诉讼保险

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摘要

Empirical studies have found that high litigation costs often discourage small firms from investing in R&D, as they fear their patent will be infringed and they will not be able to afford litigation. As a solution, firms have been encouraged to purchase insurance policies that, by covering legal costs in the event of a trial, serve as a commitment to litigate so that settlement terms are more favorable to the insured, and potential infringement is less likely to occur. However, very few firms are purchasing insurance and the market remains poorly developed throughout the world. I show that firms might be discouraged from buying insurance because of information asymmetries, not only with insurance companies but also with their competitors. I study the situation of a patent holder, who perfectly knows the validity and enforceability (strength) of her patent, which has been infringed by a competitor with less information on the patent. The patent holder can purchase insurance to have a credible threat to litigate and increase the infringer's settlement offer. But the decision to buy insurance conveys information about the patent strength to the infringer. As a result the patent holder may prefer not to be insured rather than transmitting this information. This signaling effect can yield different equilibriums, in particular, a pooling equilibrium no insurance where no patent holder purchases insurance. I study if this situation might be improved by imposing mandatory insurance or by giving the insurer a share of litigation proceeds.
机译：实证研究发现，高昂的诉讼费用通常使小公司不愿投资于研发，因为他们担心自己的专利将受到侵犯并且无法负担诉讼费用。作为一种解决方案，鼓励公司购买保险单，这些保险单通过承担审理时的法律费用而承担诉讼义务，以使和解条款对被保险人更有利，并且不太可能发生潜在的侵权行为。 。但是，购买保险的公司寥寥无几，全世界的市场仍然发展不佳。我表明，由于信息不对称，可能不鼓励公司购买保险，这不仅与保险公司有关，而且与竞争对手也有关。我研究了一个专利持有人的情况，她完全知道她的专利的有效性和可执行性（强度），而竞争者侵犯了该专利，而该专利的信息较少。专利持有人可以购买保险，对诉讼提出可信的威胁，并增加侵权人的和解报价。但是购买保险的决定将有关专利强度的信息传达给了侵权人。结果，专利持有人可能宁愿不投保，也不愿传递此信息。这种信号效应可以产生不同的均衡，特别是在没有专利持有人购买保险的情况下，没有保险的统筹均衡。我研究是否可以通过强制性保险或给保险人一定份额的诉讼收益来改善这种情况。

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  • 来源
    《The journal of risk and insurance》 |2017年第2期|631-660|共30页
  • 作者

    Duchene Anne;

  • 作者单位

    IPAG Business Sch, 184 Blvd St Germain, F-75006 Paris, France;

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  • 正文语种 eng
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