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首页> 外文期刊>The journal of risk and insurance >Board Size, Firm Risk, and Equity Discount
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Board Size, Firm Risk, and Equity Discount

机译：董事会规模，公司风险和股权折扣

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Prior literature documents that larger boards pursue conservative investment policies and that their decision outcomes are moderate, which promote an environment of risk aversion. I argue that this risk aversion hurts equity holders when firms hold a larger amount of long-term debt. Addressing potential endogeneity problems associated with board size, I find an equity discount associated with larger boards in firms that have greater amounts of long-term debt. On the other hand, larger boards are associated with an equity premium when firms have a greater short-term debt-to-assets ratio. The equity discount associated with larger boards disappears in firms with no long-term debt. Further analysis also indicates that firms with larger boards enjoy a better credit rating and a lower realized cost of debt. Overall, analysis in this study suggests that the association between board size and equity value is a function of a firm's debt structure.
机译：先前的文献证明，较大的董事会奉行保守的投资政策，其决策结果适中，这会促进规避风险的环境。我认为，当企业持有大量的长期债务时，这种风险规避会伤害股权持有人。在解决与董事会规模相关的潜在内生性问题时，我发现与长期债务较多的公司中的较大董事会相关的股权折扣。另一方面，当公司的短期债务与资产比率较高时，较大的董事会与股票溢价相关。在没有长期债务的公司中，与较大的董事会相关的股权折扣消失了。进一步的分析还表明，董事会规模更大的公司享有更高的信用等级和更低的实际债务成本。总体而言，这项研究的分析表明，董事会规模与股权价值之间的关联是企业债务结构的函数。

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