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DO THE BETTER INSURED CAUSE MORE DAMAGE? TESTING FOR ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN CAR INSURANCE

机译:更好地引起伤害吗?测试汽车保险中的不对称信息

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摘要

This article tests for the presence of asymmetric information in Dutch car insurance among senior drivers using several nonparametric tests based on conditional-correlation approach. Since asymmetric information implies that more comprehensive coverage is associated with higher risk, we examine whether the better insured have a higher frequency of claims or cause more severe accidents. Using data on claim occurrences, incurred losses and written premiums, and controlling for the insureds' experience rating, we do not find any evidence of asymmetric information in this market.
机译:本文使用几种基于条件相关方法的非参数测试来测试高级驾驶员中荷兰汽车保险中不对称信息的存在。由于信息不对称意味着更全面的承保范围与更高的风险相关,因此我们研究了保险水平较高的被保险人索赔频率较高还是造成了更严重的事故。使用关于索赔发生,已发生的损失和书面保费的数据,并控制被保险人的经验等级,我们没有发现任何证据表明该市场信息不对称。

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