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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Urban Economics >Crime and ethics
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Crime and ethics

机译：犯罪与伦理

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摘要

We consider a simple model in which agents are endowed with heterogeneous abilities and differing degrees of honesty. Agents choose either to commit (property) crimes or invest in education and become workers instead. The model is closed in that all criminal proceeds are stolen from agents working in the formal sector and that expenditures on both deterrence and punishment of criminals are paid for through taxes levied on workers. Thus, although we assume that there are no direct interactive effects among criminals, criminals crowd each other in two ways: positively in that enforcement and punishment resources become more widely diffused as more agents commit crimes, and negatively in that the presence of more criminals implies that there is less loot to be divided over a larger number of thieves. We establish the possibility of multiple equilibria and characterize the equilibrium properties. We then evaluate the effectiveness of deterrence policies under a balanced government budget.
机译：我们考虑一个简单的模型，在该模型中，特工具有异类能力和不同程度的诚实度。代理人选择犯罪（财产）或投资于教育并成为工人。这种模式是封闭的，因为所有犯罪收益都是从正规部门工作的代理人那里偷走的，威慑和惩罚犯罪分子的支出是通过对工人征收的税款来支付的。因此，尽管我们假设罪犯之间没有直接的互动影响，但罪犯却以两种方式相互拥挤：积极的执法和惩罚资源随着更多的犯罪者犯罪而越来越广泛地分散；反之则意味着更多的犯罪分子在场意味着更少的战利品可以分配给更多的盗贼我们建立了多重平衡的可能性，并描述了平衡性质。然后，我们在平衡的政府预算下评估威慑政策的有效性。

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