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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Urban Economics >Prices, capacities and service levels in a congestible Bertrand duopoly
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Prices, capacities and service levels in a congestible Bertrand duopoly

机译：拥挤的Bertrand双头垄断中的价格，容量和服务水平

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摘要

We study the duopolistic interaction between congestible facilities that supply perfect substitutes and make sequential decisions on capacities and prices, and compare the results to monopoly and first-best outcomes. At the Nash equilibrium prices and capacities, there is more congestion in the duopoly than in the social optimum. Given our assumptions, monopoly pricing and capacity choices result in the same congestion level as the social optimum. The higher congestion level under duopoly is due to strategic price responses to capacity investments. Moreover, higher marginal costs of capacity may increase duopoly profits. Lastly, when capacity is relatively cheap or demand relatively inelastic, stable asymmetric Nash equilibria may result, where the high-capacity facility offers low time costs at a high price, and the smaller facility offers lower service levels at a lower price. In that case, there is endogenous product differentiation by ex ante identical firms.
机译：我们研究了可提供完美替代品的可充填设施之间的双寡头互动，并就容量和价格做出了顺序决策，并将结果与​​垄断和最佳结果进行了比较。在纳什均衡价格和能力下，双寡头的拥挤比社会最优的拥挤更多。根据我们的假设，垄断定价和容量选择导致的拥挤程度与社会最优程度相同。双头垄断下的拥挤程度更高是由于对产能投资的战略价格反应。而且，更高的生产能力边际成本可能会增加双头垄断利润。最后，当容量相对便宜或需求相对缺乏弹性时，可能会导致稳定的不对称Nash均衡，其中高容量的设施以较高的价格提供较低的时间成本，而较小的设施以较低的价格提供较低的服务水平。在这种情况下，事前相同的公司会进行内源性产品区分。

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