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Capital indivisibility and tax competition: Are there too many business areas when some of them are empty?

机译:资本不可分割性和税收竞争:当某些业务领域为空时,会有太多的业务领域吗?

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摘要

In this paper, we propose a model where local jurisdictions must engage a development cost before competing for hosting a firm with uncertain preferences among possible sites. We first show that even an optimizing central planner managing all the jurisdictions develops more sites than there are plants to host. Doing so, he diversifies his supply and has a higher probability of hosting the firm. Then, we show that, if every jurisdiction is managed by a local government, there are more developed sites than with the central planner, which implies excess supply.
机译:在本文中,我们提出了一个模型,在该模型中,地方司法管辖区必须竞争开发成本,然后才能竞争在可能的地点之间拥有不确定偏好的公司。我们首先显示,即使是管理所有辖区的优化中央计划员,也会开发出比要托管的工厂更多的站点。这样做,他使自己的供应多样化,并更有可能成为该公司的东道主。然后,我们表明,如果每个司法管辖区都由地方政府管理,那么与中央计划者相比,有更多的开发场地,这意味着供应过多。

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