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Tax increment financing: interaction between two overlapping jurisdictions

机译：税收增量融资：两个重叠司法管辖区之间的互动

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摘要

This paper analyzes the interaction between two overlapping jurisdictions (a school district and a city), when one of them (the city) uses TIF (tax increment financing) to finance an improvement in the provision of its public good. Both jurisdictions levy taxes on property, and they provide different public goods. The city is not allowed to raise its tax rate to increase public good provision, but since the increment in the public good causes property values to increase, the city's revenue is higher with the new level of public good. However, if this new revenue is not enough to finance the new public good level, then TIF allows the city to "capture," for a limited period of time, all extra revenues the school district obtains due to the increase in property values. Then the city and the school district choose the public good level to satisfy their budget constraints with the goal of maximizing total property values. Two different results regarding efficiency of public good provision are obtained depending on the equilibrium concept used. With Nash behavior, the result is underprovision of the public good provided by the school district. The second, and more interesting, case is when the school district takes into account that its decisions affect the provision of the city's public good. In this "leader-follower" equilibrium, where the school district plays the role of the leader, the results show that the provision of the school district public good depends on how the city's public good is provided. If the city's public good is underprovided (overprovided) then the school district's public good is overprovided (underprovided).
机译：本文分析了两个重叠的辖区（一个学区和一个城市）之间的相互作用，当一个辖区（一个城市）使用TIF（税收增量融资）来筹集改善公共物品的资金时。两个司法管辖区都对财产征税，而且它们提供不同的公共物品。不允许城市提高其税率以增加公共物品的供应，但是由于公共物品的增加导致财产价值增加，因此，随着公共物品新水平的提高，城市的收入将更高。但是，如果这笔新收入不足以为新的公共物品提供资金，则TIF允许该城市在有限的时间内“捕获”该学区由于财产价值增加而获得的所有额外收入。然后，城市和学区选择公共物品等级来满足其预算约束，以使总财产价值最大化。根据所使用的均衡概念，可获得关于公共物品提供效率的两个不同结果。由于纳什行为，结果是学区提供的公共物品供应不足。第二个也是更有趣的情况是，学区考虑到其决定会影响城市公共物品的提供。在这种“领导者跟随者”均衡中，学区扮演着领导者的角色，结果表明，学区公共物品的提供取决于城市公共物品的提供方式。如果城市的公共物品供应不足（提供过多），则学区的公共物品供应过多（不足提供）。

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  • 来源
    《Journal of Urban Economics》 |2004年第1期|p.151-164|共14页
  • 作者

    Gonzalo E. Fernandez;

  • 作者单位

    Facultad de Ciencias Economicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, Calle 6 entre 47 y 48, 5to. Piso, Oficina 516, (1900) La Plata, Argentina;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 f;
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