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Environmental taxation, tax competition, and harmonization

机译：环境税收，税收竞争和协调

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This paper studies the tax competition problem in the presence of transboundary pollution. It shows that economic integration causes the firms to adopt the same or less polluting technologies, but it nevertheless increases aggregate emissions and lowers welfare. Second, the paper examines the ramifications of partial tax harmonization policies. It shows that harmonizing commodity taxes above their unrestricted Nash equilibrium value may either increase or lower the equilibrium emission tax. Under the former, firms opt for less polluting technologies, aggregate emissions decrease and welfare improves. On the other hand, if emission tax goes down, firms will choose more polluting technologies, aggregate emissions will increase and welfare deteriorates. Finally, harmonizing the emission tax above its unrestricted Nash equilibrium value, which leads the firms to adopt a less polluting technology, also causes aggregate emissions to decline and overall welfare to increase.
机译：本文研究了存在跨界污染的税收竞争问题。它表明，经济一体化使企业采用相同或更少污染的技术，但它却增加了总排放量并降低了福利。其次，本文研究了部分税收统一政策的影响。它表明，使商品税超过其不受限制的纳什均衡值以上，可能会增加或降低均衡排放税。在前者之下，企业选择污染更少的技术，减少总排放量并改善福利。另一方面，如果降低排放税，企业将选择更多的污染技术，总排放量将增加，福利将恶化。最后，将排放税统一在其不受限制的纳什均衡值之上，这导致企业采用污染较小的技术，还导致总排放量下降，整体福利增加。

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