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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of World Investment & Trade; Law, Economics, Politics >Investment Treaties and Transition from Authoritarian Rule
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Investment Treaties and Transition from Authoritarian Rule

机译：投资条约与专制统治的过渡

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Following recent events in Egypt, Libya, Myanmar (Burma) and Tunisia, foreign investors have lodged international claims under investment treaties. Several of these cases follow a common fact pattern. They concern foreign investments acquired from authoritarian governments substantially below market value through transactions that were not arms' length. Subsequently, new governments sought to renegotiate these contracts and concessions, or to change the regulatory arrangements that govern them. The investors then invoked the protections of an investment treaty. This article draws on political science scholarship on transition. It argues that investment treaties risk constraining the ability of incoming democratic regimes to consolidate their position, and questions the normative justifications for applying the principle of full market value compensation to situations in which investments were not acquired on a full market value basis. These conclusions are relevant to wider debates about the tension between legal stability and political change in international law.
机译：在埃及，利比亚，缅甸（缅甸）和突尼斯发生近期事件之后，外国投资者已根据投资条约提出了国际要求。这些情况中有几个遵循共同的事实模式。它们涉及通过独裁交易从独裁政府那里获得的外国投资，大大低于市场价值。随后，新政府试图重新谈判这些合同和让步，或改变管理它们的监管安排。然后，投资者援引投资条约的保护。本文借鉴了过渡时期的政治学奖学金。它认为，投资条约有可能限制新来的民主政权巩固其地位的能力，并质疑将完全市场价值补偿原则应用于未按完全市场价值获得投资的情况的规范性理由。这些结论与有关法律稳定性与国际法中政治变化之间的张力的广泛辩论有关。

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