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An analysis of adverse selection, entrepreneurial activity, and the decision to go public

机译：逆向选择，创业活动和上市决策的分析

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摘要

We study a regional economy with a large number of entrepreneurs who own firms and who want to go public. Specifically, our analysis focuses on the contractual interaction between a representative risk averse entrepreneur who owns a firm and a risk neutral monopolistic investment bank that proposes the terms of the initial public offering (IPO) that is placed in the market. First, we determine the terms of the IPO when there is full information. Second, we describe the attributes of the entrepreneur/bank contractual interaction when this interaction is framed as a screening problem with adverse selection. Third, we solve this screening problem fully and then we discuss the properties of the optimal solution. Finally, we point out how the preceding optimal solution is impacted when there is competition between investment banks.
机译：我们研究了区域经济，其中有大量拥有公司并想上市的企业家。具体来说，我们的分析着眼于拥有公司的代表性风险厌恶企业家与风险中立的垄断投资银行之间的合同互动，该提议提出了上市的首次公开募股（IPO）的条款。首先，当有充分信息时，我们确定IPO的条款。其次，我们将企业家/银行合同互动的属性描述为带有逆向选择的筛选问题时的属性。第三，我们完全解决了这个筛选问题，然后讨论了最优解的性质。最后，我们指出了投资银行之间存在竞争时，上述最优解决方案将受到怎样的影响。

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