Fiscal Policy, Institutional Quality and Central Bank Transparency

Dai Meixing; Sidiropoulos Moise; Spyromitros Eleftherios

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Fiscal Policy, Institutional Quality and Central Bank Transparency

机译：财政政策，机构质量和中央银行透明度

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This paper examines monetary and fiscal interactions in a framework where the government as Stackelberg leader worries about political costs of corruption and central bank opacity acts as a fiscal disciplinary device. Opacity could reduce (increase) inflation expectations, inflation (the output gap) and the responses of these variables to supply shocks, and would improve social welfare. Under the least favourable assumptions on the effect of corruption, i.e. sanding-the-wheels' or weak greasing-the-wheels' effect, opacity has a fiscal disciplining effect that could be reinforced by grand corruption. Intransparency increases corruption only if the greasing-the-wheels' effect is relatively large.

机译：本文在一个框架中考察了货币和财政互动，在该框架中，作为Stackelberg领导人的政府担心腐败的政治成本，而中央银行的不透明则充当了财政纪律手段。不透明度可以减少（增加）通胀预期，通胀（产出缺口）以及这些变量对供给冲击的反应，并改善社会福利。在对腐败影响最不利的假设下，即“打磨车轮”或“弱润滑”车轮的效果，不透明具有财政纪律效果，而大规模的腐败可能会加剧这种情况。仅当车轮润滑的效果相对较大时，不透明才会增加腐败。

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《The Manchester school》 |2015年第5期|523-545|共23页
作者
Dai Meixing; Sidiropoulos Moise; Spyromitros Eleftherios;
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Univ Strasbourg, BETA, Strasbourg, France;

Univ Strasbourg, BETA, Strasbourg, France|Aristotle Univ Thessaloniki, LEAP, Thessaloniki, Greece;

Univ Strasbourg, BETA, Strasbourg, France|Democritus Univ Thrace, Xanthi, Greece;

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Fiscal Policy, Institutional Quality and Central Bank Transparency

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