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Effects of Information Disclosure Under First- and Second-Price Auctions in a Supply Chain Setting

机译：供应链环境中一价和二价拍卖对信息披露的影响

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We study a supply chain where an upstream supplier auctions his inventory or capacity as a bundle. The importance of this setting is twofold: From a practical point of view, there are several examples, both in manufacturing (e.g., auctioning the capacity of a wafer fabrication facility) and service industries (e.g., auctioning the sponsorship of a website), where a supplier's capacity is sold as a single piecern; from a theoretical side, it highlights the information asymmetry introduced on the downstream supply chain parties when the auction result is disclosed. rnWe formulate the problem as a two-stage supply chain comprising a single supplier and two resellers. Each reseller receives a signal of the consumer demand and bids for the capacity of the supplier. The supplier announces the winner as well as the auction price. Both resellers can get additional units in a procurement market and then engage in Cournot competition in the consumer market. rnWe analyze the impact of the information elicited by the supplier in the early stage of the game. We characterize sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium behavior, derive the equilibrium bidding functions under both first- and second-price auctions, and show that the bidding functions are lower than the corresponding ones for a single-shot auction without resale. Our computational experiments indicate that both the supplier and resellers are better off running a second-price auction and that consumers benefit if the resellers have very different signals on the total demand. Overall, our results suggest that traditional auctions may have a profound impact in the context of a supply chain because of the information disclosure in the upstream stages.
机译：我们研究了一个供应链，其中上游供应商以捆绑方式拍卖其库存或能力。这种设置的重要性是双重的：从实践的角度来看，在制造业（例如，拍卖晶片制造设施的能力）和服务行业（例如，拍卖网站的赞助）中都有几个示例，其中供应商的能力以单件形式出售；从理论上讲，它突出显示了公开拍卖结果时下游供应链各方引入的信息不对称性。 rn我们将问题表述为由一个供应商和两个经销商组成的两级供应链。每个转售商都会收到消费者需求的信号，并竞标供应商的能力。供应商宣布获胜者以及拍卖价格。两家经销商都可以在采购市场中获得更多的产品，然后在消费者市场中进行古诺竞争。 rn我们分析了游戏初期供应商提供的信息的影响。我们刻画了存在均衡行为的充分条件，推导了在第一价格拍卖和第二价格拍卖下的均衡竞标函数，并表明，对于没有转售的单次拍卖，竞标函数均低于相应的竞标函数。我们的计算实验表明，供应商和转售商在进行二次价格拍卖时都比较好，如果转售商对总需求的信号完全不同，则消费者将从中受益。总体而言，我们的结果表明，由于上游阶段的信息披露，传统拍卖可能会对供应链产生深远影响。

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