• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Manufacturing and service operations management >Supply Chain Analysis of Contract Farming
【24h】

Supply Chain Analysis of Contract Farming

机译：供应链分析合同养殖

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

Contract farming is a growing practice in developing countries and first-world economies alike. It generates necessary guarantees to sustain the continued operations of vulnerable farmers while enabling the manufacturers to manage the aggregate supply and price risk. We consider a single manufacturer who owns several manufacturing plants, each with a random demand for the crop. The manufacturer selects a set of farmers to offer a menu of contracts, which is exogenously specified or endogenously determined. Each "selected" farmer chooses a contract from this menu in advance of the growing season. After the growing season, under known demands and supplies, the manufacturer minimizes the distribution costs from the selected farmers to the production facilities. We formulate this problem as a Stackelberg game with asymmetric information, where the manufacturer is the leader and the farmers are the followers. The manufacturer's problem is a two-stage stochastic planning program for which we develop two solution approaches. We have applied our model to problem instances anchored on data from a large manufacturer of potato chips contracting with thousands of small farmers in India. We report on the performance of the solution methods compared with a lower bound based on the Lagrangean dual of the problem and show that the optimality gap is below 1%, for problem instances with 1,000 potential farmers. We also show how our model can be used to gain various managerial insights. As an example, when constructing the contract menu endogenously, often a small number of contract options suffices, depending on the degree of heterogeneity among the farmer pool. Thus, relatively simple menus often suffice.
机译：合同农业是发展中国家和第一世界经济的越来越越来越多的经济。它产生了必要的保证，以维持弱势农民的持续运营，同时使制造商能够管理总额和价格风险。我们考虑一个拥有多种制造工厂的制造商，每个制造商都随机需求对作物。制造商选择一组农民提供合同菜单，这是外源指定或内源性确定的。每个“选定”的农民在不断增长的季节之前从这个菜单中选择合同。在日益增长的季节之后，在已知的需求和供应下，制造商在制造商可以最大限度地减少所选农民到生产设施的分配成本。我们将这个问题与具有不对称信息的Stackelberg游戏制定，制造商是领导者，农民是追随者。制造商的问题是我们开发两种解决方案方法的两级随机规划计划。我们已将模型应用于锚定的问题实例，从印度成千上万的小农收缩的土豆芯片的大型土豆片的数据。我们报告了解决方案方法的性能与基于Lagrangean Dual的较低限制的问题，并表明最优性差距低于1％，对于有1,000名潜在农民的问题实例。我们还展示了我们的模型如何用于获得各种管理洞察力。例如，在内源构建合同菜单时，通常少量的合同选择就足够了，具体取决于农民池之间的异质程度。因此，相对简单的菜单经常足够了。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号