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Is Diversity (Un-)Biased? Project Selection Decisions in Executive Committees

机译:是多样性(UN-)偏见?执行委员会的项目选择决策

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Problem definition: Is a committee composed of more or less cognitively diverse members better at approving the "good" projects and rejecting the "bad" ones? Academic/practical relevance: We contribute to the operations management literature by accounting for the fact that critical selection decisions are often made by a committee rather than a single decision maker. Understanding how the magnitude of diversity affects the decision quality of such a committee is an important consideration for practitioners. Methodology: We utilise a game-theoretic model to show that diverse perspectives are rarely "averaged out." Results: Diversity leads to systematic biases in project selection. To mitigate the effect of diverse perspectives, managers need to uncover the sources of diversity: do they originate from different individual valuations and preferences, or do they express different assimilations of the information that arises during the project execution? We show that this distinction is crucial. Higher preference diversity always leads to higher likelihood of making the wrong decision. Higher interpretive diversity may be beneficial for the organization. Managerial implications: A clear managerial action is the need to identify and reduce such preference diversity. Senior management can achieve this by highlighting the need for more transparency in the pipeline of the business units. Moreover, our analysis shows that interpretive diversity can be a powerful managerial lever to influence the propensity for Type I and II errors. The latter might be easier to manage than the organizational structure.
机译:问题定义:是一个委员会,由或多或少地认知各种各样的成员组成,更好地批准“好”项目并拒绝“坏”?学术/实际相关性:我们通过核算委员会往往是由委员会而不是单一决定者作出的关键选择决策来促进运营管理文献。了解多样性程度如何影响此类委员会的决策质量是从业者的重要考虑因素。方法论:我们利用游戏理论模型来表明多样化的观点很少“平均出来”。结果:多样性导致项目选择中的系统偏见。为减轻不同观点的效果,管理人员需要揭示多样性的来源:它们来自不同的个人估值和偏好,或者他们是否表达了在项目执行期间出现的信息的不同同化?我们表明这种区别至关重要。更高的偏好多样性总是导致制定错误决定的可能性更高。更高的解释性多样性可能对组织有益。管理效应:明确的管理行动是需要识别和减少此类偏好多样性。高级管理层可以通过强调业务部门管道中的更多透明度来实现这一目标。此外,我们的分析表明,解释多样性可以是强大的管理杠杆,以影响I和II型错误的倾向。后者可能比组织结构更容易管理。

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