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Product Differentiation and Collusion Sustainability When Collusion Is Costly

机译:合谋成本高时的产品差异化和合谋可持续性

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摘要

A widely debated question in recent years by both strategy theorists and antitrust practitioners is what role product differentiation between firms plays in their ability to sustain a collusive agreement in order to reduce the strength of competition and gain higher profits. This paper addresses the following question: What happens to the "product differentiation-collusion sustainability" relationship when setting up and maintaining an agreement is costly? We show that introducing collusion costs into the discussion has relevant implications. Indeed, sufficiently high collusion costs modify the underlying market structure, thus altering the product differentiation-collusion sustainability relationship with respect to the case where collusion costs are absent or low. In particular, if the gains from collusion are increasing (decreasing) with the degree of product differentiation, the relationship between product differentiation and collusion sustainability is always positive (negative), whereas if the gains from collusion are inverted U-shaped, the relationship is inverted U-shaped too. These results stress the importance of considering those markets where the coordination between firms is sufficiently costly as structurally different from those markets where coordination has no costs for firms.
机译:战略理论家和反托拉斯从业者近年来都在争论不休,这个问题是公司之间的产品差异化在维持合谋协议以降低竞争强度和获得更高利润的能力中起什么作用。本文解决了以下问题:建立和维护协议的代价高昂时,“产品差异化/共谋可持续性”关系会发生什么?我们表明,在讨论中引入串通成本具有相关的含义。实际上,足够高的合谋成本会改变潜在的市场结构,从而就不存在合谋成本或较低合谋成本的情况改变产品差异化与合谋的可持续性关系。特别是,如果共谋的收益随着产品差异化程度的增加(减少),则产品差异化和共谋可持续性之间的关系始终为正(负),而如果共谋的收益呈倒U形,则该关系为倒U形也。这些结果强调了考虑那些公司之间的协调成本足够高的市场的重要性,因为在结构上不同于那些公司没有协调成本的市场。

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