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Sourcing for Quality: Cooperating with a Single Supplier or Developing Two Competing Suppliers?

机译：采购质量：与一个供应商合作还是与两个竞争供应商合作？

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摘要

Supplier efforts regarding product quality are an important issue in outsourcing and play a critical role in a manufacturer's choice of sourcing strategy. Consider a manufacturer that wants to outsource the manufacturing of two substitute products to external suppliers. This paper studies the strategic interactions under two sourcing strategies: single and dual sourcing. A four-stage noncooperative game model is established to describe each member's decisions. We further propose four decision scenarios: single sourcing with and without manufacturer quality investment sharing and dual sourcing when suppliers cooperate or do not cooperate on quality decisions. By the backward induction approach, we obtain analytical equilibrium solutions for each decision scenario. By comparing each pair of equilibrium profiles, we find that an appropriate proportion of quality investment sharing by the manufacturer can enable a cooperating strategy with a single supplier to be the dominant strategy. When the manufacturer does not want to share or does not want to share a relatively large portion of its supplier's quality investment, it will always prefer to develop two competing suppliers when the cost of dual sourcing is sufficiently low. However, dual sourcing can be extremely risky for the manufacturer because the suppliers could provide a relatively low product quality level by cooperating on the quality decision to extract the manufacturer's profit.
机译：供应商在产品质量方面的努力是外包中的重要问题，并且在制造商选择采购策略中起着至关重要的作用。考虑一个制造商想要将两种替代产品的制造外包给外部供应商。本文研究两种采购策略下的战略互动：单采购和双采购。建立了一个四阶段的非合作博弈模型来描述每个成员的决策。我们进一步提出了四种决策方案：带或不带制造商质量投资共享的单一采购，以及供应商在质量决策上合作或不合作时的双重采购。通过向后归纳法，我们为每个决策场景获得了解析均衡解。通过比较每对平衡曲线，我们发现制造商共享适当比例的质量投资可以使与单个供应商的合作策略成为主导策略。当制造商不想分享或不想分享其供应商质量投资的相对较大部分时，在双重采购的成本足够低的情况下，它总是会选择开发两个相互竞争的供应商。但是，双重采购对制造商而言可能具有极大的风险，因为供应商可以通过合作制定质量决策来获取制造商的利润，从而提供相对较低的产品质量水平。

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  • 来源
    《Mathematical Problems in Engineering》 |2016年第5期|3040343.1-3040343.13|共13页
  • 作者

    Chen Jingxian;

  • 作者单位

    Nantong Univ, Sch Business, 9 Seyuan Rd, Nantong 226019, Peoples R China|Univ Sci & Technol China, Sch Management, 96 Jinzhai Rd, Hefei 230026, Peoples R China;

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