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Coordination Scheme for Restructuring Business Operation of the Single Period Newsvendor Problem

机译：单一时期报业者问题业务重组的协调方案

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摘要

This paper presents a coordination scheme for a single period newsvendor problem when both supplier and retailer of the supply chain agree to change the business operation from a market decision power sharing system (Model 1) to a unique decision maker system (Model 2). The supplier is assumed to be a risk-averse decision maker and he will undertake the product quality risk in both models. Model 1 is game theoretic, where the supplier controls the wholesale price, but the retailer controls the order quantity and market price. The bargaining process ends when the supplier has found a wholesale price that maximizes the value of his sales revenue minus the product quality cost. Model 2 is a centralized system where the supplier possesses all decision powers of the market. In general, Model 2 will generate higher total revenue than Model 1. The aim of this research is to propose a satisfying compromise based on consignment policy to resolve the revenue-sharing conflict in Model 2 due to the additional revenue. An example is provided to illustrate the two models and the proposed coordination scheme, along with managerial insights on the models' benefits. The impacts of several parameters on the scheme are also presented and discussed.
机译：当供应链的供应商和零售商都同意将业务运营从市场决策权共享系统（模型1）更改为唯一决策者系统（模型2）时，本文提出了一个针对单期新闻供应商问题的协调方案。假定供应商是规避风险的决策者，他将在两种模型中承担产品质量风险。模型1是博弈论的，供应商控制批发价格，而零售商控制订单数量和市场价格。当供应商发现批发价格使他的销售收入减去产品质量成本最大化时，讨价还价过程结束。模型2是集中式系统，其中供应商拥有市场的所有决策权。通常，模型2将产生比模型1高的总收入。本研究的目的是基于寄售政策提出令人满意的折衷方案，以解决模型2中由于增加收入而产生的收入共享冲突。提供了一个示例来说明这两个模型和建议的协调方案，以及对模型收益的管理见解。还介绍和讨论了几个参数对方案的影响。

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  • 来源
    《Mathematical Problems in Engineering》 |2013年第14期|308187.1-308187.11|共11页
  • 作者

    Chiuh-Cheng Chyu; I-Ping Huang;

  • 作者单位

    Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Yuan-Ze University, 135 Yuan-Tung Road, Chung-Li 320, Taiwan;

    Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Yuan-Ze University, 135 Yuan-Tung Road, Chung-Li 320, Taiwan;

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