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首页> 外文期刊>Mathematics and computers in simulation >To enter or not to enter? A competitive analysis with minimum quality standards
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To enter or not to enter? A competitive analysis with minimum quality standards

机译:要输入还是不输入?

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This paper focuses on the influences of minimum quality standards (MQS) on entry decisions for two firms located in different countries. More precisely, when each firm sells its product only in its domestic market, there is no restriction on its product's quality. However, when choosing to enter its foreign market, the quality is required to be no less than a specified MQS. A multi-stage game is established to examine the effects of such MQS on firms' strategic choices of entry into their respective foreign markets. It shows that strategic choices cause the emergence of heterogeneous equilibria in which both firms make different entry decisions and thus produce products with distinct qualities provided that the MQS lies in an intermediate range. If the MQS is relatively low, both firms are willing to enter their respective foreign markets so that they coexist in each market. A relatively high MQS induces each firm to stay only in its domestic market. Furthermore, firms never have more incentive to open a new foreign market compared to the socially efficient configuration. Compared to strong competition, weak competition causes that the equilibrium behavior privately by firms is too far from the allocation that is efficient for society. (C) 2019 International Association for Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (IMACS). Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:本文重点关注最低质量标准(MQS)对位于不同国家/地区的两家公司的进入决策的影响。更准确地说,当每个公司仅在其国内市场上销售其产品时,对其产品的质量就没有限制。但是,当选择进入其国外市场时,要求质量必须不低于指定的MQS。建立了一个多阶段博弈,以检验这种MQS对公司进入其各自国外市场的战略选择的影响。它表明,战略选择会导致异质均衡的出现,在这两种情况下,两家公司都会做出不同的进入决策,从而在MQS处于中等范围的情况下生产出具有不同质量的产品。如果MQS相对较低,则两家公司都愿意进入各自的国外市场,以便它们在每个市场中共存。相对较高的MQS会诱使每家公司只留在其国内市场。此外,与具有社会效率的配置相比,企业再也没有更多的动力去开拓新的国外市场。与强竞争相比,弱竞争导致企业私下进行的均衡行为与对社会有效的分配相距太远。 (C)2019国际模拟数学与计算机协会(IMACS)。由Elsevier B.V.发布。保留所有权利。

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