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MONETARY POLICY AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND AND AFTER: A REASSESSMENT OF QUANTITATIVE EASING AND CRITIQUE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S PROPOSED EXIT STRATEGY

机译:零下限及之后的货币政策:定量宽松和对联邦储备金拟议退出策略的批评

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摘要

This paper analyses quantitative easing, focusing on its implicit fiscal dimension. It distinguishes between 'weak' and 'strong' zero lower bound traps. A strong trap corresponds to the liquidity trap. In a weak trap QE is expansionary but subject to diminishing returns. QE implicitly transfers income streams to the fiscal authority, generating fiscal drag that can eventually render QE contractionary. Proposals to exit QE by paying interest on reserves to check inflationary pressures is contradicted because paying interest constitutes an implicit tax cut. Instead, the paper suggests implementing asset based reserve requirements that deactivate liquidity by requiring banks hold increased reserves.
机译:本文分析了量化宽松政策,重点是其隐性财政规模。它区分“弱”和“强”零下限陷阱。强势陷阱相当于流动性陷阱。在弱势陷阱中,量化宽松政策是扩张性的,但收益会递减。量化宽松将收入流隐式转移到财政当局,产生财政拖累,最终可能导致量化宽松。通过支付准备金利息以抑制通货膨胀压力退出量化宽松政策的提议是矛盾的,因为支付利息构成了隐性的减税措施。相反,该文件建议实施基于资产的准备金要求,以通过要求银行持有更多准备金来停用流动性。

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  • 来源
    《Metroeconomica》 |2015年第1期|1-27|共27页
  • 作者

    Thomas I. Palley;

  • 作者单位

    Economic Policy Adviser, AFL-CIO,Policy AFL-CIO 1913 S Street NW Washington DC 20009 USA;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
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