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The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counter-insurgency

机译：叛乱与反叛乱的理论与实践

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What, then, can be done in a war like Vietnam? Does the West have to lose such wars automatically? I said at the beginning that even the non-Westerners can lose those wars. But, either way, one must attempt to preserve the essentials. The question in my mind is this: Can we in Vietnam, or anywhere else, save (or improve) the administrative or governmental structure? The answer is obvious, and there is no other effort really worth doing. We have tried this with the "strategic hamlets" and that literally failed. Out of 8,500 strategic hamlets, about 1,400 survived the effort. Some people have spoken of what is called the "oil-slick principle," which has been described as the holding of one particular area, one central area, and working one's way out of the center. That was fine when the French developed the concept for the Sahara, because in the Sahara there are obligatory watering points. If they have all the oases, those outside have to come in and get water. But Vietnam doesn't happen to be the Sahara or an oasis. Thus, the oil-slick method succeeds mostly in pushing the Viet Cong units into the next province. Of course, it looks good, at least, because for one week there will be a "cleared" province. For the time being this is considered adequate until something more imaginative is discovered. The actual thing that can be done, and is also being done, is what the French call quadrillage (gridding). One doesn't start from the center of something and work ones way out, but he starts from the periphery and works one's way in. The chances are that if it is done right, and if it is done in enough places at once, some communist units will finally get fixed (as the army says) and caught. This may yet work, but this requires a high degree of manpower saturation not available in Vietnam. There are no easy shortcuts to solving the problems of revolutionary war. In fact, I would like to close with one last thought, which applies, of course, to everything that is done in the armed forces, but particularly to revolutionary war: If it works, it is obsolete. In Vietnam and in many other similar situations we have worked too often with well-working but routine procedures and ideas. It is about time that new approaches and-above all-ideas be tried; obviously, the other ones have been unequal to the task.
机译：那么，在越南这样的战争中可以做什么呢？西方是否必须自动输掉此类战争？我在一开始就说过，即使非西方人也可以输掉那些战争。但是，无论哪种方式，都必须尝试保留要点。我心中的问题是：我们在越南或其他任何地方，能否保存（或改善）行政或政府结构？答案是显而易见的，并且没有其他真正值得做的工作。我们已经通过“战略小村庄”进行了尝试，但实际上失败了。在8500个战略小村庄中，约有1400个幸存下来。有人谈到了所谓的“浮油原理”，它被描述为拥有一个特定区域，一个中心区域以及从中心离开的工作方式。当法国人开发撒哈拉沙漠的概念时，这很好，因为在撒哈拉沙漠中有强制性的浇水点。如果他们拥有所有的绿洲，那些外面的人必须进来取水。但是越南并不是撒哈拉沙漠或绿洲。因此，浮油法成功地将越共的部队推入了下一个省。当然，看起来至少好，因为一周内将有一个“已清理”的省。暂时认为这是足够的，直到发现更具想象力的东西。实际可以做的事情，也正在做的事情，是法国人所说的四边形（网格）。一个人不是从某事物的中心开始，而是从某个地方出来，但是他是从外围开始，然后以自己的方式进入。一个机会是，如果做得正确，并且一次在足够的地方完成，那有些共产主义部队最终将被固定（如军队所说）并被俘虏。这可能仍然有效，但这需要越南无法提供的高度的人力饱和。解决革命战争问题没有捷径可走。实际上，我想最后一句话结束，这当然适用于武装部队所做的一切，尤其是革命战争：如果奏效，那将是过时的。在越南和许多其他类似情况下，我们经常采用运作良好但常规的程序和想法进行工作。现在该尝试新的方法和以上的所有想法了。显然，其他任务与任务不相等。

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  • 来源
    《Military review》 |2015年第5期|40-48|共9页
  • 作者

    Bernard B. Fall;

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