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首页> 外文期刊>Military review >S.W.E.T. and Blood: Essential Services in the Battle between Insurgents and Counterinsurgents
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S.W.E.T. and Blood: Essential Services in the Battle between Insurgents and Counterinsurgents

机译：汗。与血：叛乱与平叛之间的战斗中的基本服务

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FM 3-24 rightfully emphasizes the importance of providing ES as a way to attack the insurgent's center of gravity, his need for popular support. However, this approach is neither new nor exclusively reserved for the counterinsurgent. Two can play that game. In the Middle East, a particular type of Islamic insurgency, the ZJAI, generates popular support by providing ES. Examples of ZJAIs are Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iraq's Sadr II movement. These organizations use zakat, the Islamic duty to help the poor, to finance their ES infrastructure. They know Western governments constrain their own militaries' use of force against noncombatants, and they count on these constraints to protect their unarmed organizations from deliberate military attack. At the same time, the Islamic duty of jihad allows them to recruit fighters. Finally, the popular support engendered by providing ES enables ZJAI fighters to blend in with the local populace. All these circumstances allow ZJAIs to coexist with much stronger military counterinsurgent forces. Moreover, because of the nature of their activities and their clever tactics, ZJAIs have the advantage when it comes to generating popular support by providing ES. As such, classic clear-hold-build strategies are ineffective against them if they (the strategies) are not supplemented by operations that attack the critical vulnerabilities of the insurgent's unarmed organizations. Overall, if the counterinsurgent is to have any success against a zakat-jihad activist insurgency, he needs to execute the provision of ES to the local population as a military operation against a capable and determined foe, not as an unopposed activity.
机译：FM 3-24正确地强调了提供ES的重要性，因为ES是攻击叛乱者重心的一种方法，而重心是他需要大众支持的。但是，这种方法既不是新颖的，也不是专为平叛分子保留的。两个人可以玩那个游戏。在中东，一种特殊类型的伊斯兰叛乱分子ZJAI通过提供ES获得广泛支持。 ZJAI的例子有哈马斯，真主党和伊拉克的萨德尔二世运动。这些组织使用zakat（帮助穷人的伊斯兰义务）来资助其ES基础设施。他们知道西方政府会限制自己的军队对非战斗人员使用武力，并且依靠这些限制条件来保护自己的手无寸铁的组织免受故意的军事攻击。同时，圣战的伊斯兰义务允许他们招募战斗人员。最后，通过提供ES获得的广泛支持使ZJAI战斗机能够融入当地民众。所有这些情况使ZJAI与强大的军事反叛力量并存。此外，由于其活动的性质和巧妙的策略，ZJAI在通过提供ES来获得大众支持方面具有优势。因此，如果没有以攻击叛乱者无武装组织的关键脆弱性的行动作为补充，经典的先发制人策略对它们无效。总体而言，如果该平叛分子要想成功对抗扎卡特圣战激进分子的叛乱，他就需要向当地居民提供ES服务，这是对付有能力和坚定决心的敌人的军事行动，而不是毫无抵抗的活动。

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