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Real-Time GPS Spoofing Detection via Correlation of Encrypted Signals

机译:通过加密信号的相关性进行实时GPS欺骗检测

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摘要

A method for detecting the spoofing of civilian GPS signals has been implemented and successfully tested in a real-time system. GPS signal spoofing is an attack method whereby a third party transmits a signal that appears authentic but induces the receiver under attack to compute an erroneous navigation solution, time, or both. The detection system described herein provides a defense against such attacks. It makes use of correlations between the unknown encrypted GPS L1 P(Y) code signals from two narrow-band civilian receivers to verify the presence or absence of spoofing. One of these receivers is assumed to be at a secure location that is not subject to spoofing. The other receiver is the potential spoofing victim for which the present developments constitute a defense. Successful detection results are presented using a reference receiver in Ithaca, New York, a victim receiver in Austin, Texas, and a spoofer in Austin, Texas.
机译:已经实现了一种用于检测民用GPS信号欺骗的方法,并已在实时系统中成功进行了测试。 GPS信号欺骗是一种攻击方法,第三方通过该信号发送看似真实的信号,但诱使接收器受到攻击,从而计算出错误的导航解决方案,时间或两者。本文所述的检测系统提供了针对这种攻击的防御。它利用来自两个窄带民用接收机的未知加密GPS L1 P(Y)码信号之间的相关性来验证是否存在欺骗。假定这些接收器之一位于安全区域,该位置不受欺骗。另一个接收者是潜在的欺骗受害者,当前的事态发展构成了防御。使用纽约州伊萨卡岛的参考接收器,德克萨斯州奥斯汀的受害者接收器和德克萨斯州奥斯汀的防盗器介绍了成功的检测结果。

著录项

  • 来源
    《Navigation》 |2013年第4期|267-278|共12页
  • 作者单位

    Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. 14853-7501;

    Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. 14853-7501;

    The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 78712-0235;

    The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 78712-0235;

    The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 78712-0235;

  • 收录信息 美国《工程索引》(EI);
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
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