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A Stackelberg game-based approach for interactions among Internet service providers and content providers

机译:一种基于Stackelberg游戏的方法,用于Internet服务提供商和内容提供商之间的交互

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摘要

This paper studies non-neutral market share where Internet service providers (ISPs) charge content providers (CPs) for the content delivery. Each provider seeks to maximize its own profit by determining its price and their service qualities (quality of service and credibility of content). First, we utilize a Stackelberg game to study the interactions between ISPs and CPs. We formulate the interactions among multiple ISPs (multiple CPs) as a non-cooperative game. In turn, the subscribers' demand for the service of a provider depends not only on their strategies, but also upon those proposed by all of its competitors. Then we provide some interesting results regarding the Nash equilibrium of this game. More precisely, we show existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium under some conditions. An iterative and distributed algorithm based on best response dynamics is proposed to achieve the equilibrium point; additionally, in order to quantify how efficient the Nash equilibrium point is, a detailed analysis of the Price of Anarchy is adopted to evaluate the performance of the system at equilibrium. Finally, extensive simulations show convergence of a proposed schema to the Nash equilibrium and show the effect of side payment on providers' policies and the effect of bandwidth cost on ISPs' policies.
机译:本文研究了非中立的市场份额,其中互联网服务提供商(ISP)向内容提供商(CP)收取内容交付费用。每个提供商都试图通过确定其价格和服务质量(服务质量和内容的可信度)来最大化自己的利润。首先,我们利用Stackelberg游戏研究ISP和CP之间的交互。我们将多个ISP(多个CP)之间的互动公式化为一种非合作游戏。反过来,订户对提供者服务的需求不仅取决于他们的策略,还取决于其所有竞争对手提出的策略。然后,我们提供有关此游戏的纳什均衡的一些有趣结果。更确切地说,我们证明了在某些条件下纳什均衡的存在和唯一性。为了达到平衡点,提出了一种基于最佳响应动力学的迭代分布式算法。此外,为了量化Nash平衡点的效率,对无政府状态价格进行了详细分析,以评估系统在平衡状态下的性能。最后,大量的仿真表明拟议的方案已收敛至Nash均衡,并显示了边际付款对提供商策略的影响以及带宽成本对ISP策略的影响。

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