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首页> 外文期刊>The North American journal of economics and finance >How does listing status affect bank risk? The effects of crisis, market discipline and regulatory pressure on listed and unlisted BHCs
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How does listing status affect bank risk? The effects of crisis, market discipline and regulatory pressure on listed and unlisted BHCs

机译：上市状态如何影响银行风险？危机，市场纪律和监管压力对上市和非上市BHC的影响

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摘要

Using a large panel of US bank holding companies (BHCs) from 2001 to 2015, we compare the risk-taking behavior of listed and unlisted banks, where there exist substantial differences in asymmetry information and agency problems. We document evidence of greater stability in listed banks versus their unlisted peers. However, listed banks became riskier than unlisted banks during the last crisis. These findings suggest the relationship between listing status and risk-taking is affected by outside factors. We find some evidence regulatory pressure was effective in limiting risk-taking by undercapitalized listed banks before, but not during the crisis. This casts doubt on the effectiveness of regulators during tumultuous times. We find large banks were exposed to less risk than small or medium-sized banks during the crisis. Debtholder discipline was ineffective in curbing the risk-taking behavior of banks. Our study indicates regulatory pressure is more effective at reducing risk than debtholder discipline, particularly for publicly listed banks.
机译：从2001年至2015年使用大型美国银行控股公司（BHCS），我们比较上市和非上市银行的风险行为，不对称信息和代理问题存在显着差异。我们记录上市银行与未列出的同行更稳定的证据。但是，上市银行在最后一次危机期间比未公布的银行变得风险。这些调查结果表明，上市状况和风险采取之间的关系受到外部因素的影响。我们发现一些证据压力有效，以限制在危机期间的欠平上市银行限制风险，但在危机期间没有。这对骚动时期的调节剂的有效性令人怀疑。在危机期间，我们发现大型银行的风险低于小或中型银行的风险。辩护者纪律对遏制银行的风险行为无效。我们的研究表明，监管压力更有效地降低风险，而不是辩论纪律，特别是对于公开​​上市的银行。

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