...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>The North American journal of economics and finance >A hybrid profit and loss sharing model using interest free-debt and equity financing: An application of game theory as a decision tool
【24h】

A hybrid profit and loss sharing model using interest free-debt and equity financing: An application of game theory as a decision tool

机译：利息自由债务和股权融资的混合损益分享模型：博弈论作为决策工具的应用

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

In this paper two models are contrasted whereby a corporation is seeking to finance the purchase of a merchandise from a supplier through a profit and loss sharing contract. The first mode consist of financing the purchase totally through equity. The second model is a new hybrid model that engages the supplier in the process as a shareholder. Both models are based on the principle of profit and loss sharing which suffers from the issue of moral hazard. This is manifestedin the form of the corporation shirking (providing low effort) and/or misreporting profits. It is argued that under equity financing, where the financier is the only shareholder, the corporation can hide part of the merchandise it sold and therefore misreport profits. This is, however, not possible under hybrid financing where, in addition to the financier, the supplier is interested in the financial reporting of the corporation. We apply a game theoretical approach where, under a hybrid financing, the financier and the supplier have mutual interest in true revenue reporting and therefore constitute a coalition (one player) against the corporation. Our game incorporates the effect of sharing markets and corporations' discounts between the game participants under each model. We show theoretically that a non-conditional good Nash equilibrium exists under hybrid financing. This case does not apply to an all equity financing where the existence of a good Nash equilibrium is conditional upon the financier and the supplier sharing ratios. This shows that under the hybrid model the corporation is always induced to provide more effort (not shirk) and truly report profits.
机译：在本文中，两种型号形成鲜明对比，公司正在寻求通过利润和损失共享合同来向供应商提供购买商品。第一种模式包括完全通过股权融资。第二种模型是一种新的混合模型，可以将供应商作为股东。两种型号都基于损益分享的原则，遭受道德危害问题。这是旨在为公司推迟（提供低努力）和/或误报的利润的形式。有人认为，在股权融资下，金融家是唯一股东，公司可以隐藏其销售的商品并因此隐藏误报的利润。但是，这是在混合融资下不可能在金融家外，供应商对公司的财务报告感兴趣。我们在混合融资，金融家和供应商处于杂交融资，金融家和供应商处具有相互利益的游戏理论方法，因此构成了对公司的联盟（一名球员）。我们的游戏纳入了在每个模型下的游戏参与者之间共享和公司折扣的效果。我们理论上显示了在混合融资下存在无条件的良好纳什均衡。本案不适用于所有股权融资，其中纳什均衡的存在是金融家和供应商共享比的条件。这表明，在混合模型下，公司总是引起的，以提供更多的努力（不推卸）和真正的报告利润。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号