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首页> 外文期刊>The North American journal of economics and finance >Did covenants distort risk signals from bank subordinated debt yields before the financial crisis?
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Did covenants distort risk signals from bank subordinated debt yields before the financial crisis?

机译：在金融危机之前，是否陈述了银行次级债务收益率的风险信号？

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摘要

Restrictive covenants on bank debt require a bank to take or refrain from specific actions that affect the riskiness of that debt. Although covenants all but disappeared in the 1990s, they reemerged after 2004 with an increase in bank risk leading up to the financial crisis. Subordinated debt yields potentially enable better risk monitoring by supervisors, but covenants can shift risk from bondholders to stockholders without reducing overall bank risk. This can distort the risk signal used by market participants to discipline excessive risk taking. Because covenants are endogenous and increase during periods of bank stress, the yield signal is dampened the most precisely when regulators most need accurate risk monitoring.
机译：银行债务的限制契约要求银行采取或避免影响债务风险的具体行动。虽然契约在20世纪90年代之外都消失了，但他们在2004年后再次收入了通往金融危机的银行风险。次级债务收益率可能导致监事会更好的风险监测，但契约可以从债券持有人向股东转向风险，而不会降低整体银行风险。这可以扭曲市场参与者使用的风险信号，以纪律过度风险。由于契约是内源性和在银行应力期间增加，因此当监管机构最需要准确的风险监测时，产量信号最恰当地润滑。

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