Capital market liberalization: Optimal tradeoff and bargaining delay

Dong Baomin; Gu Xinhua; Song Huasheng

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Capital market liberalization: Optimal tradeoff and bargaining delay

机译：资本市场自由化：最佳权衡和讨价还价延迟

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Host and investing countries are faced with a tradeoff between growth and volatility arising from capital flows. The host country seeks capital inflows for high growth, yet worries about accompanying volatility so much that it limits capital market opening due to its financial weakness. However, the investing country solicits quick and safe returns from capital outflows by requesting wide foreign openness. It is often observed that one side's push for opening encounters the other side's reluctance. We examine how this conflict of interest is resolved for international compromise equilibrium through sequential bargaining between the two sides with private valuations of capital flows. We find that openness bargaining can end up with strategic delay after information revelation. This finding sheds light on certain puzzles in international finance. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

机译：东道国和投资国面临着资本流动带来的增长与波动之间的权衡。东道国寻求资本流入以实现高增长，但对随之而来的动荡不安的担忧太大，以至于由于其财务疲软，它限制了资本市场的开放。但是，投资国通过要求广泛的对外开放来从资本外流中寻求快速，安全的回报。经常观察到一侧推动打开会遇到另一侧的勉强。我们研究了如何通过双方之间通过私下对资本流动进行估值的讨价还价来解决这种利益冲突，以实现国际妥协平衡。我们发现，公开讨价还价可能会在信息泄露后以战略性延迟而告终。这一发现阐明了国际金融中的某些难题。（C）2016 Elsevier Inc.保留所有权利。

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来源
《The North American journal of economics and finance》 |2017年第1期|78-88|共11页
作者
Dong Baomin; Gu Xinhua; Song Huasheng;
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作者单位

Henan Univ, Coll Econ, Kaifeng, Peoples R China;

Univ Macau, Fac Business Adm, Zhuhai, Peoples R China;

Zhejiang Univ, CRPE, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, Peoples R China|Zhejiang Univ, Coll Econ, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, Peoples R China;

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原文格式 PDF
正文语种 eng
中图分类
关键词
Financial integration; Volatility; Growth; Capital controls; Bargaining;

机译：金融一体化;波动性;增长;资本控制;讨价还价;

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1. Optimal Policy for Financial Market Liberalizations: Decentralization and Capital Flow Reversals [J] . Theo S. eicher, Stephen J. Turnovsky, Uwe Walz German economic review . 2000,第1期

机译：金融市场自由化的最佳政策：分权和资本流动逆转
2. Optimal capital structure, bargaining, and the supplier market structure [J] . Yongqiang Chu Journal of financial economics . 2012,第2期

机译：最佳的资本结构，讨价还价和供应商市场结构
3. Why do emerging markets liberalize capital outflow controls? Fiscal versus net capital flow concerns [J] . Joshua Aizenman, Gurnain Kaur Pasricha Journal of International Money and Finance . 2013,第deca期

机译：为何新兴市场要放开资本流出管制？财政与净资本流动的关系
4. European gas market liberalization and bargaining power [C] . Nicolas Rivière IAEE international conference . 2011

机译：欧洲天然气市场自由化和议价能力
5. Capital liberalization, capital flows, and monetary policy responses on exchange market: The case of Korea. [D] . Chung, Jae-Ho. 2001

机译：资本市场开放中的资本自由化，资本流动和货币政策对策：韩国为例。
6. Valuation effect of capital account liberalization: Evidence from the Chinese stock market [O] . Haoyuan Ding, Yuying Jin, Kees G. Koedijk, -1

机译：资本账户开放的估值效应：来自中国股市的证据
7. Financial Development and the Distributional Effects of Monetary Policy Do the distributional consequences of monetary policy depend on the extent of financial development? Should optimal monetary policy vary across countries? In order to answer these questions, we develop a monetary growth production model with heterogeneous agents. In our economy, optimal policy needs to weigh the effects of policy across two groups — capital owners and individuals who hold liquid assets. While banks help limit the exposure to inflation, there are limits because money alleviates the frictions of private information and limited communication. In this environment, we compare two economies that are identical in every aspect except for their level of financial development. In a country with limited financial development, a stock market is absent. In the other, an equity market is active. In either economy, inflation adversely affects capital formation and output. Individuals who hold liquid assets are always adversely affected by inflation, but the attitude of capital owners depends on the level of financial development. In particular, in the presence of a stock market, the impact of inflation on the welfare of capital owners is non-monotonic. Nevertheless, optimal monetary policy is always more conservative at higher levels of financial development. [O] . TINA M. Edgar A. Ghossoub, TINA M. Robert R. Reedy 100

机译：金融发展和货币政策的分配效应货币政策的分配后果是否取决于金融发展的程度？各国的最优货币政策应该不同吗？为了回答这些问题，我们开发了一个具有异构代理的货币增长生产模型。在我们的经济中，最优政策需要权衡两个群体的政策效应 - 资本所有者和持有流动资产的个人。虽然银行帮助限制通胀风险，但存在限制，因为资金减轻了私人信息的摩擦和有限的沟通。在这种环境下，我们比较两个经济体在各个方面都是相同的，除了它们的金融发展水平。在金融发展有限的国家，缺乏股票市场。另一方面，股票市场活跃。在任一经济体中，通胀都会对资本形成和产出产生不利影响持有流动资产的个人总是受到通货膨胀的不利影响，但资本所有者的态度取决于金融发展的水平。特别是，在股票市场存在的情况下，通货膨胀对资本所有者福利的影响是非单调的。尽管如此，在较高的金融发展水平下，最优货币政策总是更加保守。

Capital market liberalization: Optimal tradeoff and bargaining delay

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